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Bodily state plays a critical role in our perception. In the present study, we asked the
question whether and how bodily experience of weights influences time perception.
Participants judged durations of a picture (a backpack or a trolley bag) presented
on the screen, while wearing different weight backpacks or without backpack. The
results showed that the subjective duration of the backpack picture was dilated when
participants wore a medium weighted backpack relative to an empty backpack or
without backpack, regardless of identity (e.g., color) of the visual backpack. However,
the duration dilation was not manifested for the picture of trolley bag. These findings
suggest that weight experience modulates visual duration estimation through the linkage
between the wore backpack and to-be-estimated visual target. The congruent action
affordance between the wore backpack and visual inputs plays a critical role in the
functional linkage between inner experience and time perception. We interpreted our
findings within the framework of embodied time perception.
Keywords: duration estimation, weight, action affordance, bodily states, embodiment
Introduction
Our cognition and perception are grounded in bodily state as well as its interaction with
environment (Clark, 1999; Barsalou, 2003). For example, when observers wear a heavy backpack,
the geographical slant is likely to be overestimated both in real and virtual hills (Proﬃtt et al., 1995;
Witt and Proﬃtt, 2007). Similar eﬀects of weight experience have been shown in judgments of
spatial distances and monetary values (Witt et al., 2004; Jostmann et al., 2009). When participants
threw a heavy ball, the subjective distance was biased by the ball that they threw (Witt et al., 2004). It
has been argued (Proﬃtt, 2006) that such distorted perception reﬂects the physical energetic costs
associated with action plans, as heavy objects, compared to light objects, require more physical
strength to act, which is in line with the framework of embodied cognition (Clark, 1999; Barsalou,
2008) that perception, body, and action are tightly linked together.
Not only spatial perception, time perception can also be better understood within the framework
of embodiment (Clark, 1999; Droit-Volet et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2013; Maniadakis et al., 2014).
Studies have demonstrated that bodily states markedly inﬂuence time perception (Yarrow et al.,
2001; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009; Hagura et al., 2012; Shi et al., 2013; Jia et al., 2015). For example,
external trains of clicks and intake of drugs (e.g., amphetamine) can change bodily arousal levels,
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leading to distortions of perceived durations (Maricq et al.,
1981; Penton-Voak et al., 1996). Similarly, studies have shown
pictures that are more arousing are often perceived longer
than low arousal ones (Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Voluntary
actions or action preparation can also adjust bodily states,
aﬀecting subjective time (Eﬀron et al., 2006; Hagura et al., 2012;
Maniadakis et al., 2014; Jia et al., 2015). Noted, action-based
bodily regulation may overwrite potential inﬂuences of aﬀective
stimuli on subjective time. For instance, when participants could
freely imitate high-arousal facial expressions presented on the
screen, the durations of presented angry and happy faces were
often overestimated. But such subjective duration expansion
diminished when their imitation of the facial expressions was
inhibited by holding a pen between their lips (Eﬀron et al.,
2006). A recent study (Jia et al., 2015) has also demonstrated
that possibility of stimulus–response interaction could change
perceived duration of a tactile stimulus.
To explain interactions between subjective time and
interoceptive (bodily) states, Craig (2009) proposed awareness
theory based on brain imaging studies. According to this
theory, the anterior insula cortex uniﬁes meta-representations
of homeostatic feeling states that produce a cinemascope ‘image’
of sentient self across time, and subsequently subjective time is
estimated through these moments (Craig, 2009; Wittmann et al.,
2010; Wittmann, 2013).When a stimulus is related to the survival
of body self (e.g., an approaching object toward the observer,
see Jia et al., 2015), the inner sentient moments run fast, and
subsequently its duration is overestimated. Several recent studies
have provided the evidence of this claim (Wittmann et al., 2010;
Pollatos et al., 2014; Jia et al., 2015). For instance, the awareness
of bodily states inﬂuences duration judgments of emotional ﬁlms
(Pollatos et al., 2014). When watching ﬁlm clips, one group were
told to notice their bodily states, whereas the other group were
asked to pay attention to the details of ﬁlm clips to answer several
questions later. Afterward, participants recalled the duration
of ﬁlm clips. The results showed that attending to bodily states
increased the eﬀects of emotional states on duration judgment
compared to attending to clips.
However, the body-related events (e.g., action and emotional)
are often accompanied with the changes of arousal, indicated by
physiological body response (e.g., increase of skin conductance
response and contraction of muscles for threats; Bradley et al.,
2001). In other words, bodily states and arousal are hard
to separate. In addition, these salient events might capture
attention (Vuilleumier, 2005). Another two classic accounts of
time perception, the general arousal account and the ‘attention-
gate’ theory, can also partially explain time distortions of body-
related events using the internal clock model (Gibbon et al.,
1984; Gibbon and Church, 1990). According to the internal
clock model, the internal clock consists of a pacemaker, a
switch, and an accumulator. The switch is located between the
pacemaker and the accumulator. When the switch closes, the
temporal pulses emitted by the pacemaker are transmitted to the
accumulator where the number of pulses decides the length of
subjective duration; when the switch opens, the accumulation
process stops. Some body-related stimuli would increase the
arousal, according to the arousal account, speeding up the
pacemaker to emit pulses, and resulting in duration dilation
(Hodinott-Hill et al., 2002; Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Nather
et al., 2011). By contrast, the ‘attentional-gate’ theory (Block and
Zakay, 1997; Zakay and Block, 1997) proposed that attention
resources are divided between temporal processing of the clock
and non-temporal processing. If a body-related event engages
more attention, less attention would be allocated to the timing
process in the clock, inducing a loss of some temporal pulses
due to the ‘ﬂickering’ open and closed states of the switch.
Consequently, duration is underestimated. These three accounts
highlight the importance of self-reference, arousal, and attention
factors on duration judgment, respectively. The question of
which factors play what critical roles in timing has been hot
debated recently (Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and
Gil, 2009; Maniadakis et al., 2014). Noted, the self-referential
process is often coupled with the change of arousal, with the
former emphasizing the interaction between the to-be-estimated
stimulus and the observer (embodiment). They could commonly
contribute to duration distortions in some body-related contexts,
although the self-reference and the sensorimotor states seem to
play a more important role than aﬀective states (Eﬀron et al.,
2006; Nather et al., 2011; Pollatos et al., 2014).
Previous studies concerning embodied timing interpreted that
changes of bodily states (e.g., implicit action) caused by target
stimuli are critical for duration distortion of the target stimuli
(Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009; Wittmann et al., 2010; Shi et al.,
2012; Maniadakis et al., 2014). In most cases, the target stimuli
and changes of bodily states have some causal relationship, or
at least are highly relevant. However, it is unclear whether a
functional linkage between the target stimuli and bodily states
is necessary for subjective time distortion, or just the change of
bodily states already distorts subjective duration. Investigation
of such question would provide a new view of interactions
between bodily states and timing. One approach is to examine
whether and when the duration of a neutral visual stimulus
would be distorted in the context of some speciﬁc bodily states
induced by nonvisual sources, such as weight experience. It
has been suggested that weight experience could change bodily
states (Proﬃtt, 2006). For instance, wearing a heavy backpack
requires our bodies to aﬀord with more physical eﬀorts relative
to wearing a light backpack, and thus diﬀerent pressure states
in the sensory-motor loop might inﬂuence temporal judgment
by speeding up internal sentient moments (or / and the clock)
of weight experience (Craig, 2009; Nather et al., 2011). Given
that the neutral visual stimulus is irrelevant to the change of
bodily states activated by the weight experience, can the weight
experience still impact on visual time judgments in general?
If this is the case, it will suggest that the weight experience
aﬀects timing by mediating arousal. Alternative, inﬂuences of
weight experience on visual duration judgments may require
some functional linkages, such as by similar action aﬀordance
between weight experience and visual target stimulus. According
to the theory of aﬀordance (Gibson, 1979), diﬀerent objects in
the environment have diﬀerent aﬀordances for manipulation.
For example, hammer usually aﬀords hitting, knife cutting, and
backpack wearing. In line with this view, neurophysiological
studies have revealed that even observing the static picture of a
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manipulable object (e.g., tools) could activate the premotor and
parietal motor areas (Chao and Martin, 2000; Grezes and Decety,
2002; Kiefer et al., 2011). The aﬀordance oﬀers the possibility
of the linkage between external stimulus and bodily states,
which might aﬀect perception and cognition. Studies have shown
that recognition of a pictorial object was aﬀected by another
pictorial object through the congruent action aﬀordance (Helbig
et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011). Based on similar reasoning,
we hypothesize that the linkage established by the congruent
aﬀordance between weight experience (‘wearing’ behavior) and
visual target containing ‘wearing’ aﬀordance (e.g., backpack
picture) might be critical for duration distortion of the visual
target. Note that arousal and functional linkage are not mutually
exclusive, and both can aﬀect time judgment at the same time.
Very heavy weight experience may cause great arousing, which
may expand subjective duration in general (Gibbon et al., 1984;
Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Here, we were most interested in
whether the functional linkage mediates weight experience and
time judgments, thus we only used medium weight in the
study.
The present study was designed to investigate whether and
how weighted experience, wearing a 5.7 kg backpack, inﬂuences
visual duration judgments. In particular, whether congruent
action aﬀordance between weight experience and visual target
plays a key role in subjective time distortion. Participants were
asked to judge the duration of computer-presented pictures,
either a backpack or trolley bag, while wearing a real weighted or
empty backpack. The function of backpack is ‘wearing’, whereas
the function of trolley bag is ‘pulling’. Thus, a backpack picture
with aﬀordance of ‘wearing’, regardless of its feature (e.g., color,
style), might activate its functional linkage to weight experience
through the congruent aﬀordance. Then the weighted experience
induced by the wore weighted backpack, associated with more
energy costs, might dilate subjective duration of the backpack
picture via such functional linkage, whereas the ‘pulling’ trolley
bag is incongruent in aﬀordance with the ‘wearing’ backpacks,
such that the weight experience may have little inﬂuence on
duration judgments of the visual trolley bag. Alternatively, the
general arousal account (Gibbon et al., 1984; Gibbon and Church,
1990) would predict that the duration distortions induced by the
wore backpack, if any, would be similar for both backpack and
trolley bag pictures. Similarly, the ‘attentional-gate’ theory (Zakay
and Block, 1997) would predict underestimated durations, if any,
for both the backpack and the trolley bag pictures. This is because
if attention is distracted by the wore backpack during the time
estimation, less attention for the visual timing task would lead
to underestimation. To disassociate these alternative accounts,
we conducted three experiments. Experiment 1 compared
visual duration estimations of the backpack picture among the
conditions of wearing weighted backpack, empty backpack, and
no backpack conditions. The backpack depicted in a picture was
the same to the wearing one. In Experiment 2, we changed the
identity of the visual backpack picture, but remained the same
congruent ‘wearing’ aﬀordance. In Experiment 3, we changed
the backpack picture to a trolley bag picture, which has diﬀerent




Fifty-ﬁve students from Jiangnan University took part in the
experiments (18, 19, and 18 in Experiments 1, 2, and 3,
respectively; 37 female; mean age= 20.7, SD= 2.7). The numbers
of females were 11, 12, and 14 in Experiments 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity and no somatosensory disorders. All participants
were naive to the purpose of experiments. The experiments
were approved by the ethics committee of Jiangnan University.
Informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
was obtained from each participant before the start of the
experiment.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The experiments were conducted in an isolated cabin with dim
lit environment. Visual stimuli were presented on a 21-inch
CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Visual stimuli
consisted of the following pictures: blue and orange backpacks
(12 cm × 9 cm), small gray business trolley bag (10 cm × 10 cm,
see Figure 1). Participants were asked to keep standing and
holding a light response box during blocks. The viewing distance
was kept at 57 cm. Visual stimuli presentation was controlled
by Matlab program using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard,
1997).
In each trial, the to-be-estimated visual duration was the
exposure time of a picture, which could be a blue backpack
(Experiment 1), an orange backpack (Experiment 2), or a gray
trolley bag (Experiment 3). During all experiments, participants
wore a blue backpack (44 cm × 32 cm × 35cm) depicted in
Figure 1A. Prior to the experiment, participants were told that
the weights of the blue backpack (Figure 1A), orange backpack
(Figure 1B), or small trolley bag (Figure 1C) in pictures were the
same as the wore blue backpack (weighted or empty).
Experimental Procedure
A classic temporal bisection task was used in the experiments.
Participants were ﬁrst trained to discriminate two visual anchor
durations: a short one (200 ms) and a long one (600 ms).
The anchor stimulus was a white rectangle (12 cm × 9 cm
FIGURE 1 | Visual pictures used in three experiments for duration
judgments. (A) The blue backpack picture presented in Experiment 1, and
participants wore this type of backpack in all experiments; (B) The orange
backpack picture used in Experiment 2; (C) The small trolley bag picture used
in Experiment 3.
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for Experiments 1 and 2; 10 cm × 10 cm for Experiment
3), same size as the pictures used in the experiments. The
training session ended when participants reached 100% accuracy
of discrimination for consecutive 20 trials.
In the subsequent test session, illustrated in Figure 2, each
trial started with a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms, followed by a
blank display randomly for 500∼800 ms. Then a target picture
(backpack in Experiments 1 and 2, trolley bag in Experiment 3)
was presented for a given probe duration, randomly selected from
200, 300, 400, 500, or 600 ms. After the picture presentation, a
question mark was shown to prompt for a response. Participants
had to judge whether the duration of the picture was closer to the
short anchor (200 ms) or the long anchor (600 ms) as accurately
as possible by pressing the left or right key on the response box,
respectively. The inter-trial interval (ITI) varied randomly from
1000 to 1500 ms.
The test session consisted of three conditions of wearing
weights block-wisely: the weighted backpack (5.7 kg), empty
backpack (0.7 kg), and no backpack (baseline) conditions. Each
weight condition was repeated twice, and randomly intermixed
with the other conditions. Within each block, ﬁve probe
durations were repeated randomly for 10 times, yielding 50 trials
per block. Thus, the test session consisted of 300 trials. To refresh
participants about the short and long anchors, each of the two
anchors was presented for ﬁve times at the beginning of each
block. Participants took a rest about 2 min by taking oﬀ the
backpack between blocks. The length of the test session was
around 50 min.
After the test session, participants were asked to rate the
valence and arousal using the paper sheet of the aﬀective-
rating Self-Assessment-Manikin (SAM) in order to compare
the arousal levels among three conditions of wearing weights.
The SAM evaluation is 9-point scales rating, ranging from
sad to pleasant for the ‘valence’ and from calm to activated
for the ‘arousal’ (Bradley and Lang, 1994). To make sure that
participants understood the meanings of 9 points on valence and
arousal scales, respectively, they were presented with the detailed
instruction before their evaluation.
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of a trial sequence. Note that the target picture
was a blue backpack, an orange backpack, and a trolley bag in Experiments
1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Results
The proportions of ‘long’ responses for the ﬁve probe durations
were calculated and ﬁtted by a logistic function for each
participant at each weight condition. The points of subjective
equality (PSEs) of the temporal bisection were then estimated
corresponding to the duration at the 50th percentile of the
ﬁtted curves. To measure the sensitivity of duration judgments,
the just-noticeable diﬀerences (JNDs) were estimated by taking
half the diﬀerence in durations between the 25th and 75th
percentiles (see detailed method in Shi et al., 2012). Repeated-
measures ANOVAswith wearing weight as factor were conducted
separately on the PSEs and JNDs in all experiments, and
then further LSD contrast tests were performed to see the
signiﬁcant diﬀerences among conditions of wearing weights.
Similar ANOVAs were applied for subjective arousal ratings.
Duration Judgment
Experiment 1 examined the inﬂuences of wearing a backpack on
the duration judgment of the same backpack picture. Figure 3
shows the psychometric curves of the visual-duration bisection
task for the weighted backpack, empty backpack, and baseline
conditions, respectively. The mean PSEs (±SE) were 373 ± 9,
391 ± 9, and 394 ± 13 ms for the weighted backpack, empty
backpack, and baseline conditions (Table 1). Repeated measures
ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of wearing weights on
the visual duration judgment, F(2,34)= 3.66, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.18.
The further post-hoc contrast tests showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in PSEs between the weighted and empty backpack conditions
(diﬀerence: 18 ms, p< 0.05), and between the weighted backpack
and baseline conditions (diﬀerence: 21 ms, p < 0.05), but not
between the empty backpack and baseline conditions (p = 0.70).
The JNDs (±SE) were 53 ± 6, 50 ± 4, and 55 ± 3 ms for
the weighted backpack, empty backpack, and baseline conditions
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 1. Mean proportions of ‘long’ responses
in the visual duration bisection task, and the fitted psychometric functions, are
plotted against the probe durations for the three weight conditions. The inset
figure shows the mean PSEs, and related standard errors, for the three
conditions (all ∗p < 0.05).
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TABLE 1 | Mean of points of subjective equality (PSEs) and just-noticeable differences (JNDs) for three weight conditions across all experiments (ms).
PSE(±SE) JND(±SE)
Weighted Empty Baseline Weighted Empty Baseline
Experiment 1 373(9) 391(9) 394(13) 53(6) 50(4) 55(3)
Experiment 2 388(11) 412(10) 404(13) 53(4) 62(5) 54(3)
Experiment 3 398(12) 395(13) 401(12) 55(3) 58(4) 51(4)
(Table 1). A repeated-measures ANOVA failed to show any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence on JNDs among these three conditions,
F(2,34) = 0.69, p = 0.51, η2p = 0.04.
Experiment 2 changed the identity of the backpack picture,
yielding similar results as those of Experiment 1 (Figure 4). The
mean PSEs (±SE) were 388 ± 11, 412 ± 10, and 404 ± 13
ms for the weighted, empty backpacks and baseline conditions,
respectively (Table 1). The ANOVA revealed that the inﬂuence
of the feeling of weight on visual duration judgments was
signiﬁcant, F(2,36) = 3.5, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.16. The post-hoc
contrasts showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in PSEs between the
weighted and empty backpack conditions, the weighted and
baseline conditions, respectively (diﬀerences: 24 and 16 ms,
both p < 0.05), but no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
empty backpack and baseline conditions (p = 0.44). A further
ANOVA on discrimination sensitivity (JNDs) showed a marginal
signiﬁcance among three conditions, F(2,36) = 3.3, p = 0.05,
η2p = 0.16. Further contrast tests indicated that the JND in the
weighted backpack condition was signiﬁcantly lower than that in
the empty backpack condition (p < 0.05), while no diﬀerences
were shown in other comparison conditions (weighted backpack
vs. baseline: p = 0.83; empty backpack vs. baseline: p = 0.07).
Experiment 3, on the other hand, revealed diﬀerent outcomes
(Figure 5). The mean PSEs (±SE) were in similar magnitudes for
the three conditions: 398± 12, 395± 13, and 401± 12ms for the
weighted, empty backpacks and baseline, respectively (Table 1),
and failed to reveal any main eﬀect of perceiving weight on the
FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiment 2. The psychometric functions are fitted
for the three weight conditions. The inset figure shows the mean PSEs (SE) for
the three conditions (all ∗p < 0.05).
visual duration judgment, F(2,34) = 0.28, p = 0.76, η2p = 0.02.
Similar to the previous two experiments, the JNDs (±SE) also
failed to show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence among three conditions,
F(2,34) = 1.23, p = 0.31, η2p = 0.07.
Assessment of Arousal
Given that subjective ratings of arousal were similar across
three experiments, we collapsed arousal ratings across three
experiments for the weighted backpack, empty backpack,
and baseline conditions. The total results showed that the
subjective ratings of arousal signiﬁcantly diﬀered among the three
conditions (Greenhouse–Geisser Correction: F(2,108) = 5.14,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.09). The further contrast tests showed that both
weighted (mean 4.95) and empty (mean 4.72) backpacks were
rated to be more arousing than the baseline (mean 4.53) (both
p < 0.05), but there was no evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the weighted and empty backpack conditions (p = 0.12).
Discussion
The present study examined how wearing a medium weighted
backpack modulated visual duration judgments. We found that
wearing a weighted backpack (5.7 kg) lengthened subjective
duration of a backpack picture, regardless of the identity of
the backpack. In contrast, weight experience failed to impact
FIGURE 5 | Results of Experiment 3. The psychometric functions are fitted
for the three weight conditions. The inset figure shows the mean PSEs (SE) for
the three conditions.
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duration judgments of a trolley bag picture. The ﬁndings suggest
that the eﬀect of weight experience on visual duration judgments
depends on a functional link between weight experience and the
to-be-estimated picture.
Our ﬁndings of diﬀerential impacts of weight experiences
on visual duration judgments could hardly be explained by the
arousal-based account (Gibbon et al., 1984) or the attentional-
gating theory (Zakay and Block, 1997). SAM evaluation showed
that the rated arousal levels for the weighted and empty
backpacks were higher than baseline condition. According to
the arousal account, visual duration should be expanded, if
any, across all experiments for wearing backpack compared
to not wearing backpack. However, the duration expansion
eﬀect was only revealed for the weighted backpack condition
in Experiments 1 and 2 where the visual targets were backpack
pictures, but not in Experiment 3 where the visual target was
a trolley bag. Alternatively, attentional-gating theory would
predict that attention shifts away from the duration judgment
task, if any, to the weight experience, the visual duration
would be underestimated, not overestimated. However, such
underestimation was not observed in our experiments. Moreover,
both arousal and attention accounts would predict reduced
temporal sensitivity of temporal bisection in the wore backpack
condition compared to the baseline condition, which was not the
case in our study as we failed to ﬁnd their signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in JNDs. It should be pointed out, we do not argue that attention
and arousal states cannot aﬀect duration judgments (in fact, they
do signiﬁcantly inﬂuence duration judgments shown in other
studies), rather we suggest merely using attention and arousal
states cannot explain the present ﬁndings.
Alternatively, our ﬁndings can be better explained by the
awareness theory based on the embodiment framework (Craig,
2009; Wittmann, 2013; Maniadakis et al., 2014), according to
which time perception is an accumulation process of self-related
moments (Craig, 2009; Wittmann et al., 2010). In line with
this view, recent studies have shown the modulation of near-
body arousing stimuli on duration judgment (Eﬀron et al.,
2006; Wittmann and van Wassenhove, 2009; Shi et al., 2012;
Jia et al., 2015). The bodily experience initiated by the to-
be-estimated stimuli with near-body meaning might speed up
inner sentient ‘moments’, leading to duration dilation (Wittmann
et al., 2010; Pollatos et al., 2014). It should be noted that in
most previous studies bodily states are directly manipulated by
aﬀective stimuli or related actions, which are closely related
to duration judgments. The present study, on the other hand,
provides the ﬁrst evidence that the functional linkage between
timing task and self-referential process is important for the
interactions between visual duration judgments and weight
experience. The activity of weight pressure was irrelevant to the
to-be-estimated target (here the backpack or trolley bag picture),
but they could be automatically linked through congruent action
aﬀordance. Speciﬁcally, when the visual target was the ‘wearable’
backpack but not a trolley bag, similar to what they wore in
aﬀordance, the inner sentient moments for the weight experience
and visual estimation were possibly merged together, biasing the
time estimation of the visual input in the weighted backpack
condition. By contrast, when the visual input had diﬀerent action
aﬀordances (e.g., ‘pulling’ of the trolley bag), the inner sentient
moments for the weight experience and visual stimulation were
likely to be separated, resulting in no eﬀect of weight experience
on visual duration judgments. Similar congruency eﬀect of
aﬀordance has been demonstrated in response performance
(Chen and Bargh, 1999; Alexopoulos and Ric, 2007). The present
study extended the aﬀordance congruency eﬀect to duration
judgments.
One might argue, however, the same category (‘backpack’),
rather than congruent aﬀordance, between weight experience
and visual blue or orange backpacks, contributed to the linkage.
Both the visual blue and orange backpacks can be categorized
as ‘backpack’, but trolley bag cannot. Thus, the category linkage
between visual backpacks and the wore backpack might be
proposed to induce the impact of weight on visual timing.
Gibson (1979) assumed that the same category (deﬁned by the
common features) just means a conceptual ‘family resemblance’
and does not correspond to the congruent aﬀordance. We believe
aﬀordance congruency, rather than same category, provides
direct linkage between bodily states and time process. First, it
has been shown that similar action aﬀordance, not the same
category, modulated task performance (Helbig et al., 2006;
Weatherford et al., 2015). For example, recognition of the
target object following a prime object was facilitated when two
objects had the congruent action aﬀordance, although could be
classiﬁed diﬀerently (e.g., pan–dustpan) (Helbig et al., 2006).
Second, objects with congruent aﬀordance elicited common
neural activities related to motor (Kiefer et al., 2011; Sim
et al., 2015), which provides potential mechanism underlying the
interaction between perception and bodily states. On this ground,
we believe that the congruent aﬀordance between the visual input
and weight experience contributed to duration distortion. Still,
physiological measures should be used in future work to identify
a neural linkage between weight experience and visual timing
through the congruent aﬀordance.
Conclusion
The present research extends the evidence of embodied timing
by revealing that wearing a weighted backpack dilates subjective
visual duration through a functional linkage. The congruent
action aﬀordance between wearing behavior of weight and visual
target is critical for such functional role of weight experience on
visual timing. Note that we only applied three types of stimuli
in visual modality. Thus, future work should expand stimuli
to more general categories, and focus on inﬂuences of various
types of action linkage between weight experience and duration
estimation by using diﬀerent types of sensory inputs, not limited
to visual modality.
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